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DTSTART:20181028T030000
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UID:calendar.13538.field_data.0@www.glad.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260403T174202Z
CREATED:20181012T164021Z
DESCRIPTION:In this talk we will briefly overview some of our recent result
 s in the area of optimalauctions: We will first study a standard Bayesian 
 auction setting\, where multiple bidders havei.i.d. valuations for a singl
 e item\, showing that for the natural class of MonotoneHazard Rate (MHR) d
 istributions\, offering the same\, take-it-or-leave-it price to allbidders
  achieves an (asymptotically) optimal revenue. We will then present a gene
 ralduality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian 
 auctionsinvolving many bidders\, multiple items and arbitrary joint value 
 distributions. Wewill demonstrate the power of the framework by applying i
 t to special single-biddersettings with independent item valuations drawn 
 from various distributions ofinterest\, to design both exact and approxima
 tely optimal auctions. Previous exactsolutions were essentially only known
  for up to two items and for a very limitednumber of specific distribution
 s. Finally\, we will study a dynamic market settingwhere an intermediary i
 nteracts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can beeither seller
 s or buyers: their identities\, as well as the sequence length\, aredecide
 d in an adversarial\, online way. The intermediary has some prior\,distrib
 utional knowledge of the agents' values for the items\, and uses aposted-p
 rice selling mechanisms. Some of the related papers have appeared in EC'14
 \, ICALP '15 and '17\, WINE'18\, andthey can be found in the following lin
 ks: https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2329https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.03399https:/
 /arxiv.org/abs/1703.09279https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.00800  
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20181016T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20181016T120000
LAST-MODIFIED:20200528T093127Z
LOCATION:Room B203\, II floor
SUMMARY:Optimality\, Approximation and Robustness in Auctions - Yiannis Gia
 nnakopoulos
URL;TYPE=URI:http://www.glad.uniroma1.it/node/13538
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